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ABSTRACT Attacks on software systems occur world-wide on a daily basis targeting individuals,
corporations, and governments alike. The systems that facilitate maritime shipping are at risk of serious
disruptions, and these disruptions can stem from vulnerabilities in the software and processes used in these
systems. These vulnerabilities leave such systems open to cyber-attack.
Assessments of the security of maritime shipping systems have focused on identifying risks but have not
taken the critical (and expensive) next step of actually identifying vulnerabilities present in these systems.
While such risk assessments are important, they have not provided the detailed identification of security
issues in the systems that control these ports and their terminals.
In response, we formed a key collaboration between an experienced academic cybersecurity team and a
well-known commercial software provider that manages maritime shipping. We performed an analysis of
the information flow involved in the maritime shipping process, and then executed an in-depth vulnerability
assessment of the software that manages freight systems. In this paper, we show the flow of information in-
volved in the freight shipping process and explain how we performed the in-depth assessment, summarizing
our findings. Like every large software system, maritime shipping systems have vulnerabilities.
INDEX TERMS ICT (Information and Communications Technologies), maritime container terminals,
software assurance, software security, software systems, vulnerability assessment
I. INTRODUCTION
The maritime sector is crucial to the world economy, and
the computer technology that manages it is critical to its
successful operation. Maritime ports in the EU handled 4.0
billion metric tons of seaborne goods in 2017, which marked
an increase of 11.69% when compared with 2009 [1]. In
the US, in 2018 maritime ports collectively handled 70.7%
of America’s international trade by weight [2]. Maritime
shipping uses millions of containers and employs millions
of people to move billions of tons of freight annually. The
world economy is therefore critically dependent upon the
maritime movement of cargo and containers. Consequently,
the economy is also dependent upon the software systems
that facilitate maritime operations.
Maritime freight transportation increasingly relies on In-
formation and Communications Technology (ICT) to manage
and optimize its operations and services. ICT makes the
essential operations not only manageable but also cost effec-
tive. This technology is involved in many areas, from traffic
control communications to container freight tracking to the
actual movement of containers. As a consequence, there is
an increased dependency on electronic communication and
processes with little human interaction. In addition to these
benefits, the freight ICT systems also introduce the risks of
being extremely vulnerable to cyber-attack. It is important
to note that these ICT systems are based largely on software
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that has been written specifically to support the operations of
maritime freight systems.
Freight ICT systems are large and complex, having many
components used by different principals involved in the sup-
ply chain. Some of these components are used by the general
customers, for example the Port Community System (PCS),
to book and track shipments and exchange documents and
information between public and stakeholders. Other compo-
nents are intended to be used by port operators, for example
the Terminal Operating System (TOS), to control container
movement and storage in the maritime port. There is also a
back-office management and integration system, which al-
lows companies to manage, link, and share internal processes
with suppliers and customers. Attackers can take advantage
of the complexity of this diverse collection of software. For
example, in 2013 drug traffickers recruited hackers to breach
the ICT systems that controlled the movement and location
of containers in the Belgian port of Antwerp, managing
to reroute (for two years) containers carrying drugs, guns,
and cash [3]. In 2017, Maersk was hit by the devastating
NotPetya cyber attack. This attack disabled their entire IT
infrastructure, affecting the company’s operational capacity
for months and costing Maersk around $300 million [4].
Other recent maritime cyber attack examples include two
attacks in 2018: one on the Port of Barcelona (Spain) and
another on the Port of San Diego (USA) [5], [6].
The software that manages and controls freight trans-
portation systems must be hardened against cyber-attacks.
Disruption or unavailability of these ICT systems could have
disastrous consequences in cost and availability of goods.
Attacks against vulnerabilities in the software can lead to
a wide range of consequences. These consequences include
disruption of service, shipment of cargo to unintended des-
tinations, threat to human lives (for example, by remotely
controlling the twistlocks of a container spreader to release
it over a person), and operation of seaport machinery by
unauthorized users. Therefore, there is a critical need to
ensure the robustness of the ICT systems and to secure them
against cyber-attacks.
This research represents the first in-depth analysis of a
software system that controls maritime shipping. As of June
2020, the software assessed is used in almost 100 container
terminals worldwide, therefore our assessment contributed to
make our world a bit more secure. While there have been
significant efforts at assessing risk in such transportation
environments, and even external penetration tests on port
facilities, the software itself is at risk.Approaches like attack
and mitigation trees [7] are most useful when they are used
at design time in the software development life cycle. In
our work we assess already-implemented software, so cannot
assume that such secure design work was done (and, in most
cases, it has not been done). In addition, attack trees are best
at finding vulnerabilities for which a tree has been provided;
they are not designed to find new types of vulnerabilities. For
commodity software, like the Windows or Linux operating
systems, the risk of exploitation is shared by many user
communities. For maritime shipping (as in many other trans-
portation sectors), the user community is smaller, the risk
more focused, and the consequences of a breach substantial.
It is essential that there be:
1) A global recognition of the risk of not assessing the
software in depth
2) The willingness for software providers to allow
scrutiny of their software
3) Resources available to accomplish the in-depth soft-
ware assessments
4) Transparency and reporting for the results of such
assessments
5) Training available for the transportation software prac-
titioners to learn the skills of building secure systems
6) Regulations that capture the requirements for improved
software security
Our effort represents an important bridge between best
practices in academia and a world leader in container termi-
nal software. In our experience, it takes courage and a leap
of faith to expose your commercial software to such detailed
evaluation. However, the benefits of such an evaluation can
be huge, including both a significant improvement in opera-
tional security and an increased confidence in the systems by
the stakeholders depending on the software.
In the next section, we review the most closely related
research in this area. In Section III, we present an overview
of the surprisingly intricate flow of information that takes
a container from the exporter to the importer. In Sec-
tion IV, we then describe the in-depth software vulnerability
methodology, called First Principles Vulnerability Assess-
ment (FPVA), that we used in this effort. In Section V,
we present the results of our FPVA assessment, including
descriptions of the vulnerabilities found and the remediation
strategies used.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been an increasing awareness of port security in the
past decade. Nevertheless, assessment of the security of mar-
itime freight systems (in both the E.U. and U.S.) has faced
two significant limitations. First, while existing studies have
been directed at taking the important first step of identifying
risks, they have not taken the critical and expensive next step
of actually identifying the vulnerabilities present in the ICT
systems. Second, these studies have focused on overall port
operations. While such overviews are important and have
resulted in overall recommendations for policy change, they
have not provided a detailed evaluation of security issues in
the ICT systems that control these ports.
In this section, we review related work in the areas of risk
assessment in container seaports, focusing on its relationship
to in-depth software assessment of maritime freight ICT
systems.
There have been several efforts to address the risk as-
sessment of seaports. Current efforts for risk assessment for
maritime security are summarized in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 1: Cyber-Physical Security Efforts
SAURON is an ongoing European project whose goal is to
develop a platform for port operators to have physical, cyber,
and hybrid situational awareness [8]. SAURON is investi-
gating the prevention, detection, response, and mitigation of
physical and cyber threats to ports.
Previous European Projects like MEDUSA and MITI-
GATE focused on assessing risks in the maritime supply
chain and port/maritime systems [9], [10]. MEDUSA con-
centrated on the port IT infrastructure at the supply chain
level, while MITIGATE concentrated at the asset level. These
approaches are intended to quantify risk, but not whether a
vulnerability in the code exists, where it exists, or how it
might affect the higher-level spheres (physical assets, net-
works, information infrastructure).
Existing security standards, best practices, maritime reg-
ulation, and risk assessment methodologies and tools fail to
adequately address the specific needs of port authorities [11],
[12]. Researchers in the S-Port project developed a prototype
software platform consisting of a collaborative environment
to host security management services and guide commercial
ports to monitor and self-manage their port ICT security [13].
Safety standards and regulations were identified (specifically
in ISO 27001 and ISPS Code), and then actions were taken
to address some specific security management needs of port
ICT systems. The architecture of the S-Port platform incorpo-
rates various collaborative tools, which are focused on high-
level risk assessment [14].
Historically, physical security has been the main emphasis
when thinking about port security; the various seaports stan-
dardization bodies did not specifically reference ICT/Cyber-
security in their memoranda [15]. Most of the existing freight
seaport security standards and methodologies concentrated
only on the physical security of the ports (i.e., safety con-
cerns) [16].
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) developed
guidelines for maritime cyber risks as the basis for future
regulation in the maritime and seaport sector. During the
IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) session held in
June 2017, the Committee approved MSC.428(98) Maritime
Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management Systems
[17]. Following MSC.1/Circ.1526, which was superseded
by MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3, the resolution affirms that approved
safety management systems should take cyber risk manage-
ment into account, considering also confidentiality for certain
aspects of cyber risk management [18], [19]. The updated
guidelines provided recommendations to safeguard shipping
from current and emerging cyber threats and vulnerabilities.
That document acknowledges that vulnerabilities can result
from inadequacies in design, integration and/or maintenance
of systems, as well as lapses in cyber discipline. In particular,
they describe five elements to identify and manage cyber
risks: (1) identify, (2) protect, (3) detect, (4) respond, and
(5) recover. These steps complement a kill chain approach
to vulnerability identification [20]. The kill chain is the
sequence of steps taken by an attacker to accomplish an
attack; if the defender breaks (defeat) any of those steps,
then the attack is prevented. To use a kill chain, you first
need to identify the elements in the chain (step 1, identify)
and then remove one or more of those elements (step 2,
protect). So, kill chains can be thought of as elaborating on
and complementing the first 2 steps.
Our in-depth software vulnerability assessment activities
(described in Sections IV and V) directly addresses the first
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FIGURE 2: Shipping Logistics Data Flow.
Note that Figure 3 – Figure 8 show each area of this figure at a larger scale.
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three of these elements by:
1) Identifying the parts of the software that are of greatest
risk
2) Protecting the software by removing the vulnerabilities
3) Detecting potential points of attack before they can be
exploited
The 2017 update to the guidelines further emphasized the
importance of what is in the 2016 edition.
Since port ICT systems face combined physical and cyber
threats, a holistic risk assessment methodology for these
infrastructures should combine the analysis of physical and
ICT aspects. For example, using MSRAM [21] and CMA
[22] for physical risk assessment, and using CRAMM [23],
OCTAVE [24], or current standards such as ISO27005 and
ISO27032 [25], [26] and NIST-SP 800-30 [27] for ICT risk
assessment.
While awareness of cyber risks is steadily increasing in
the maritime sector, we need to go beyond risk assessment
to the actual evaluation of software systems that operate in
this environment. The first step to an in-depth assessment of
the software that controls maritime freight shipping consists
of understanding the software involved. There cannot be a
serious cybersecurity analysis without considering the soft-
ware. For that purpose, we investigated the maritime shipping
process and documented all the transactions (both electronic
and in paper) involved. This documentation is detailed in the
next section.
III. UNDERSTANDING SHIPPING LOGISTICS
The process by which a shipping container carries goods
from an exporter in one country to an importer in another
can be viewed as a series of document and communication
transactions. To begin our evaluation of these transactions,
we used documentation prepared by the Port of Valencia,
Spain [28].
Figure 2 shows the communications/transactions involved
in shipping logistics. Due to the large and complex nature
of freight logistics, it is beneficial to approach the process
in stages. For the purposes of this paper, there are six such
stages: booking, forwarding, outbound customs, outbound
shipping, inbound shipping, and delivery. To better visualize
these stages, the transactions involved in each stage are
shown in Figure 3 through Figure 8. Each arrow represents
a transaction of paper document (green), digital document
(red), container movement (blue), or unspecified communi-
cation (black). Transactions are chronologically numbered.
Simultaneous transactions in the same figure share the same
number and are identified by letter.
A. BOOKING
Several booking-related documents must be created and ex-
changed before the container can be moved. In this section,
parenthesized numbers refer to edges in Figure 3. The im-
porter and exporter first agree on the goods to be purchased
and shipped (1.1). For the sake of simplicity, we do not
show the importer in this figure. The exporter contacts the
freight forwarder (1.2a) who will negotiate shipment with
the consignee that operates in the desired seaport (1.3, 1.4,
and 1.5). A Bill of Lading is created by the consignee and
given to the cargo ship, forwarder, exporter, and importer
(1.6a, 1.6b, 1.7, and 1.8). When the exporter is ready to
ship, it sends an advance ship notice to the forwarder who
sends it to the consignee (1.9 and 1.10a). The consignee
sends delivery and acceptance orders to the forwarder (1.11b)
who sends them to the inland carrier and railway (1.12d and
1.12c). If the shipment is to contain any dangerous goods, the
consignee reports them to the port authority (1.10b). When
the port authority and harbor master approve the goods,
authorization is recorded and given to the consignee (1.11a,
1.12a, and1.12b).
B. FORWARDING
Once booking documents are in place, the goods will be
forwarded to the seaport. Parenthesized numbers in this sec-
tion refer to edges in Figure 4. The inland carrier first takes
the delivery order to the depot at the seaport to receive the
consignee’s container and takes the empty container to the
exporter (2.1 - 2.2). The container is packed and sealed in
the presence of a representative of the exporter who signs
a delivery note and gives it to the carrier (2.3b). The carrier
takes the full container and an acceptance order to the railway
terminal (2.3a and 2.3c). The carrier is given a transfer note
to document the exchange (2.4b). The railway operator loads
and sends the container to the port terminal along with an
unloading list that documents the goods (2.4a and 2.4c). The
consignee sends to the terminal an acceptance order, and the
terminal sends the consignee a transfer note to document the
interchange (2.5a and 2.5b).
C. OUTBOUND CUSTOMS
Many containers are subject to customs clearance and/or
inspection once they arrive at the seaport. Edges in Figure 5
are referenced by parenthetical numbers in this section. The
container is taken to a checkpoint run by the customs office
(3.1a). Customs declarations are sent by the consignee in
the form of a “Single Administrative Document” to the
customs office at the port (3.1b). If the container is to be
inspected, a “red circuit” is initiated (3.2). The container is
moved to the inspection site (3.3), certified, and returned to
the customs office and port terminal (3.4a, 3.4b, and 3.4c).
Clearance documentation is sent to the consignee (3.5a). If
the container contains any dangerous goods, they are reported
to and tracked by the port authority (3.5b).
D. OUTBOUND SHIPPING
With the container certified and available at the terminal,
arrangements must be made for its loading and shipment out
of the port. In this section, parenthetical numbers are refer-
ences to single edges in Figure 6. After sending shipment
instructions to the terminal (4.1), the consignee sends and
receives authorizing documents to the port authority for the
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FIGURE 3: Booking Logistic Data Flow
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cargo ship to dock (4.2, 4.3a, 4.4, and 4.5a), some of which
are sent to the harbor master for record and reference (4.3b
and 4.5b). The consignee must also report to the customs
office a loading list for record of the goods (4.6). The docked
ship then sends its bayplan to the terminal (4.7), where
arrangements are made for the ship to be unloaded and loaded
by stevedores (4.8, 4.9, and 4.10). If any dangerous goods
are loaded, they are reported to maritime rescue authorities
for tracking (4.11). Once loading is complete, the consignee
makes a request to the port authority to embark (4.12), and
notifies the ship after it is authorized by the port authority and
harbor master (4.13, 4.14, and 4.15). The consignee sends a
cargo manifest to the port authority (4.16a), which reviews
it with the customs office before documenting its acceptance
(4.16b, 4.17a, and 4.17b). An updated bayplan is sent back to
the ship as it departs (4.18).
E. INBOUND SHIPPING
The process of shipment into the receiving port begins as the
cargo ship nears it. Parenthetical numbers in this section refer
to edges in Figure 7. When the cargo ship approaches the
receiving port, the consignee arranges for authorization from
the port authority to dock (5.1, 5.2a, 5.3, and 5.4a). The port
call number and mooring authorization are sent to the harbor
master for record (5.2b and 5.4b). Dangerous goods must be
reported to and authorized by the port authority and recorded
by the harbor master (5.6, 5.7, and 5.8). The consignee sends
an entry summary declaration to the port authority which
forwards it to the customs office (5.9a and 5.9b). The customs
office accepts the declaration (5.10a), and the consignee is
notified (5.10b). A Single Administrative Document is sent
to the customs office along with an unloading list (5.11a
and 5.11b). Once customs clearance is granted (5.12), the
port terminal arranges for stevedores to unload and load the
ship (5.13, 5.14, and 5.15). Locations of dangerous goods are
reported to the port authority (5.16), and a manifest of them
are sent to the consignee (5.17).
F. DELIVERY
The final stage of the process is to move the full container
from the port, deliver the goods to the importer, and return
the empty container to the depot. Parenthetical numbers in
this stage are references to edges in Figure 8. The consignee
sends its customs clearance and delivery order to the terminal
(6.1) and a transfer order to the railway terminal that will
take the container (6.2). The railway terminal sends a load-
ing/unloading list to the port terminal (6.3), where internal
transportation unloads and loads the appropriate containers.
The container and an acceptance document are sent to the
railway terminal (6.4a and 6.4c), and a departure notice is
sent back to the consignee (6.4b). The consignee sends the
required carriage documents to the inland carrier (6.5) which
brings the consignee’s delivery order to the railway terminal
in order to take the container (6.6). The railway terminal
gives the carrier a transfer note documenting the interchange
(6.7b). The carrier delivers the container to the importer,
where it is unloaded (6.7a). The empty container is then
brought with the consignee’s acceptance order to the depot
where it is stored until a new shipment is ready (6.8a and
6.8b).
IV. IN-DEPTH VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
In the previous section, we showed a transactional view of
shipping logistics. In this section, we describe the method-
ology for performing an in-depth vulnerability assessment
of two of the modules of the software that controls the
transactions previously described. This assessment includes
a deep analysis of the software including a low-level code
review that goes beyond the use of automated assessment
tools. The ultimate goal is to find critical vulnerabilities
so that the software providers could remediate them before
attackers are able to exploit them.
The modules:
1) A web system that facilitates port status and manage-
ment access for external stakeholders. It also includes
services for processing and storing information includ-
ing ship schedules and location, container locations,
gate access status, dangerous goods locations, and
loading/discharge lists. External stakeholders, includ-
ing shippers and consignees, can check the status of
this information through this module. This module is
315,000 lines of code, mostly Java and ActionScript.
2) A web application that communicates yard tractor jobs
to the operators in those vehicles. Tractor operators log
into the web application from a mobile device. The
clients to this module can view the yard tractor jobs
and update the status of them as they arrive and are
completed. This module is 7,000 lines of code, mostly
Java and JavaScript.
The overall effort took 7 person-months. The vulnerabili-
ties found were reported to the head of the development team,
followed by several interactions with the development team
as to how to fix the vulnerabilities. The patched code was
then re-assessed by our team.
Until recently, there was no structured methodology for
in-depth assessment of software systems at the code level.
Simply trying to examine all the code in a complex system
such as these would be an overwhelming task, a task beyond
any reasonable cost or staffing. Based on our previous expe-
rience with analyzing code for security flaws, we developed
the First Principle Vulnerability Assessment (FPVA) method-
ology [29]. FPVA was developed primarily as an analyst-
centric approach to assessment, the aim of which is to focus
the analyst’s attention on the parts of the software system and
its resources that are mostly likely to contain vulnerabilities
related to high-value assets. FPVA has been used to evaluate
many well-known systems, including Google Chrome [30],
HTCondor [31], and Wireshark [30].
Rather than working from known vulnerabilities, the start-
ing point for FPVA is to identify high value assets in a
system: those components (for example, processes or parts
of processes that run with high privilege) and resources (for
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example, configuration files, databases, connections, devices)
whose exploitation offer the greatest potential for damage
by an intruder. From these components and resources, we
work outward to discover execution paths through the code
that might exploit them. This approach has two immediate
advantages. First, it allows us to find new vulnerabilities, not
just exploits based on those that were previously discovered.
Second, when a vulnerability is discovered, it is likely to be
a serious one whose remediation is of high priority.
FPVA starts with an architectural analysis of the code,
identifying the key components in a distributed system. It
then goes on to identify the resources associated with each
component, the privilege level of each component, the value
of each resource, the interaction between components, and
the delegation of trust. The results of these steps are docu-
mented in clear diagrams that provide a roadmap for the last
stage of the analysis, which is the manual code inspection.
Additionally, the results of this step can also form the basis
for a risk assessment of the system, identifying which parts
of the system are most immediately in need of evaluation.
After these steps, we then use code inspection techniques on
the critical parts of the code. Our analysis strategy targets
the high value assets in a system and focuses attention on
the parts of the system that are vulnerable to not just unau-
thorized entry but specifically unauthorized entry that can be
exploited.
After we know where to focus the search, which means
after we understand what are the high value assets, we can
apply a variety of tools and techniques to the actual analysis
of the code. It is worth noting that automated tools comple-
ment the manual inspection of the code but never replace it.
In the FPVA of freight ICT systems, we followed the
following steps:
1) Architectural Analysis: Identify the different soft-
ware components (processes and threads) running on
the different hosts, the communication amongst those
components, and the points where the different users
interact with the system. Both TOS and PSC are com-
plex, with many components facilitating the interaction
among the seaport stakeholders including the port au-
thority, the container terminal, the consignee, and the
forwarder.
2) Resource Identification: Identify the different re-
sources (logical and physical) accessed by the compo-
nents in step 1. For example, relevant resources include
the bill of lading, bayplan, the list of containers with
dangerous goods, and the database containing informa-
tion on the containers on the yard. An attacker gaining
access to these critical resources would result in severe
damage.
3) Privilege Analysis and Trust Delegation: Identify the
resource protections, the privilege levels at which each
component runs, and the delegation of trust. Authenti-
cation and authorization of access to resources are also
identified in this step. We analyze the trust relation-
ships between key entities such as terminal stations,
port operators, forwarders, and shipping companies.
4) Component Evaluation: Perform a fine-grain evalua-
tion of the critical components and resources identified
in step one and two. This step is the most time consum-
ing and involves the identification of vulnerabilities as
well as the construction of proof-of-concept exploits.
The process of this step is described below.
It is important to emphasize that FPVA helps us to identify
vulnerabilities that are not commonly known or described,
in addition to common traditional weaknesses. As we men-
tioned above, steps 1–3 of FPVA identify those parts of
the software that would have the highest security impact
if they were to be successfully exploited, the high value
assets. This identification allows us to focus our analyst
resources on the parts of the system that are most critical.
For example, consider that after applying steps 1-3, we see
that there is a database used to store log entries that are
not consumed by any process. So even if an attacker could
modify that database, the impact of their action would be
null. Now consider a root-owned file whose content is used
by a root user ID process. In that case, an attacker gaining
access to that file might cause serious harm. The information
obtained by the step 3 of FPVA is essential to determine
which are the high value resources of the system. Through
this approach, we identified both common vulnerabilities and
vulnerabilities specific to the system we analyzed. Examples
of vulnerabilities that we found when assessing the TOS
are described in the next section, but before that it is worth
mentioning examples of common code weaknesses we look
when performing a vulnerability analysis [32]:
• Improper or insufficient data validation: refers to ac-
cepting and trusting the input supplied by a user without
performing validity checks, and is the cause of many
types of serious vulnerabilities.
• Improper error handling: can allow many types of vul-
nerabilities, including privilege escalation, disclosing
information, or denial of service.
• Buffer overflows: allows a program to overflow the
boundary of a memory buffer, either for reading or writ-
ing of the member. As a consequence, an attacker can
change the behavior of the program or expose sensitive
information.
• Numeric errors: where an arithmetic operation results
in a numeric value that is outside of the range that can
be represented with a given number of bits, causing the
program to make inappropriate decisions that can affect
access or modification of the system and data.
• Injection attacks: these include command injection,
SQL injection, and XML injection. Injection attacks
occur where a program constructs a string that contains
user input (such as their name or address), and then this
string is interpreted by the system (such as making a
database request). If the program does not limit the use
of the user data, it can allow an attacker inappropriate
control of the system.
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• Web attacks: cross-site scripting (XSS), cross-site re-
quest forgery (CSRF), session hijacking, and open redi-
rect. These attacks can allow an attacker to control or
forge access to a website.
• Directory traversal: a defect where an attacker accesses
files and directories that are stored outside their autho-
rized directory in the file system. Such access can ex-
pose private information or allow inappropriate access
to a system.
In this research, we applied the FPVA methodology for the
first time in the maritime domain with the goal of making its
software less vulnerable to cyber-attack. We applied FPVA
to modules of the TOS and PCS provided by a well-known
software provider in maritime freight shipping. The next
section summarizes our findings.
V. FPVA VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT RESULTS
In this section, we summarize the results of performing an
in-depth vulnerability assessment on some modules of a
TOS and PCS from a well-known software provider in the
domain of maritime freight shipping. A thorough report and
discussion of vulnerability results is not within the scope of
this paper. It is worth noting that our results were reported to
the software developers in full, including close collaboration
to remedy the discovered vulnerabilities, and that our team
re-assessed the patched software.
We first show an example (Figure 9) of the artifacts result-
ing from the first three steps, namely architectural, resource,
and privilege analyses, for one of the modules that we as-
sessed. We then briefly describe the vulnerabilities found.
Figure 9 shows the attack surface, that is the points where
the user (or an attacker) can supply input to the system. It also
shows that that module is composed of processes running on
three different hosts, each with a different functionality. In
orange, we show a process running as user “SYSTEM” (the
system privileged user), and the resources that are accessed
by that process. In green, we show the processes running
as user “Admin” (the application administrator), and the
resources accessed by those processes, such as log files.
The points in the code where a resource or privilege is
abused as a consequence of an attack constitutes the impact
surface. During our analysis we produced detailed low-level
diagrams.
Figure 9 is the result of applying FPVA steps 1-3. In step 4,
we inspected the code affecting the identified high-value as-
sets, as we explain next. During our process of understanding
component interactions (Architectural Analysis), access to
resources (Resource Analysis), and delegation of operations
(Trust and Privilege Analysis), we evaluate for paths through
the code from the attack surface to the impact surface. The
operations on this path can be described as the cyber kill
chain [20], where disrupting any one of those could prevent
the attack.
Inspection of the diagram indicates that the most valu-
able resources are accessed through interactions with the
monolithic Oracle database file. This guides our source code
evaluation to begin at the code which interfaces with the
database. We first enumerate each call to the DB manager in
the Tomcat source code, prioritizing accesses to high value
tables like the one storing passwords. For each of these
calls, we set breakpoints in the code, and then interact with
the application normally to record stack traces when any
of those breakpoints are reached. Each one of these stack
traces becomes a possible attack vector, which we investigate
in more detail. For example, with a breakpoint set at every
access to the username/password database table, we interact
with the system’s login, registration, password change, and
similar actions. The resulting stack traces provide a list of
functions to check for faulty logic or other security flaws that
we can exploit. One such function was a unique code path for
updating a password which bypassed the normal code path to
verify passwords. In this way, we uncovered a vulnerability.
In our code assessment, we found several high-impact
vulnerabilities. Some of the vulnerabilities we found and
reported include the following weaknesses:
1) Improper authorization and authentication design al-
lowed illegal access to the system’s database. There-
fore, the following issues arose:
• Any user could change any other user’s pass-
word. By circumventing client-side validation,
an attacker could request a password change for
another user without providing a correct current
password. This vulnerability was a result of faulty
validation logic on the server.
• Users could access unauthorized services by
tampering with client-supplied request meta-
data. For example, an attacker could craft a re-
quest for Service A with metadata that indicated
Service B. The server would authorize the request
based on the metadata indicating Service B, but
then invoke Service A. This is an example of
a trust boundary violation; the server is trusting
that the metadata from the client is consistent
with the service request’s destination. Since client
applications can easily be replaced or compro-
mised, the server must assume it is untrusted.
For this reason, any validation, authorization, or
authentication performed by the client must also
be rechecked by the server.
Design issues such as these are often the most expen-
sive and time-consuming to fix. Some design problems
could be detected early in the software development
life cycle by using Microsoft’s Threat Modelling tool
[33]. Nevertheless, at this point is it worth quoting
“security systems design is making promises which
poor software development practises cannot keep”
[34]. Complex design problems are only detectable by
an expert analyst.
2) Improper validation in custom file services allowed any
user to modify or delete files throughout the server’s
file system. An attacker could generate a legitimate
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FIGURE 9: High-level architectural diagram for one of the modules assessed.
file download request using the client’s user interface
and then modify it to specify deleting, downloading, or
overwriting any specific file on the server. This vulner-
ability was a result of both improper sanitizing of the
file name to prevent path traversal and lenient access
control for the i/o services. Note that the combination
of this weakness along with the password compromise
vulnerability in weakness 6 would allow an attacker to
steal the username and password for every user of the
system.
This vulnerability was challenging to find, and it is
unlikely to have been found either by automated as-
sessment tools or by penetration testing. The code
actually tried to sanitize the input, but it did not cover
the specific case that we used for the attack. Note
that the weakness that allowed this vulnerability was
previously unknown. It required examination of the
code to discover it. As a result, this would not have
been found with penetration testing. However, now that
this is a known technique for attack, new penetration
studies can benefit from its discovery.
3) A web server did not check client authorization on
all requests. Therefore, many operations were vulner-
able to unauthorized access, once the user submitted a
correct username and password. By not tracking any
login state, the server trusts the client to ensure that
unauthorized requests are not made. This is a violation
of the trust boundary between client and server.
This vulnerability was challenging to find and required
a careful inspection of the code. Neither automated
assessment tools nor penetration testers are likely to
have discovered it.
4) An attacker could arbitrarily add log entries to log files.
By doing that, the attacker could erase log file history
in 2 minutes, as when a threshold was met, the oldest
log file was deleted. This vulnerability alone is not
severe; however, it may allow an attacker to hide other
dangerous activities by overwriting the log.
The effort to find this type of vulnerability is medium:
it will not be found by automated assessment tools, but
it might be found by penetration testers.
5) HTTP traffic was not encrypted. As a consequence, the
system was vulnerable to:
• Session hijacking: HTTP sessions are tracked
using session ID cookies. The server determines
client identity and state by associating data with
a particular session. If traffic is unencrypted, the
value of this session ID can be recorded by an
attacker. The attacker can then send requests us-
ing that session ID to effectively impersonate the
victim, gaining access to all resources available to
the victim whose session was hijacked.
• Password sniffing: A user’s username and pass-
word is transmitted in plain text when logging into
the system. Any devices connected to the same
physical (or virtual) network as a client or server
will be able to read the username and password of
any user that logs into the system via that network.
• Sensitive information exposure: Because all sys-
tem traffic is unencrypted, an attacker can observe
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all of the transactions and requests made to the
system without directly accessing the system. For
example, if a port administrator requested a sched-
ule of dangerous goods while connected to a public
network, then any device on that public network
could also view that schedule.
This vulnerability might have been found by automated
assessment tools or network monitoring tools.
6) Password compromise: Instead of using a salted, one-
way, cryptographic hash function, the system stores
passwords using an insecure form of two-way en-
cryption. The function uses the decryption key as a
password’s initialization vector, storing this key in both
the database and configuration files. The server also
writes the encryption key to the general server log
every time a password is checked or updated. In the
case of a stolen or compromised database file (which
was made possible by weakness 2), an attacker could
trivially decrypt the passwords stored in the database.
This would lead to full compromise of all accounts and
disclosure of users’ (potentially reused) passwords.
7) Use of vulnerable versions of third-party software
components exposed the system to existing exploits
for those components. In any modern software system,
third-party components such as framework libraries,
operating systems, compilers, and protocols make up a
large part of the software supply chain. Many of these
components contain dangerous vulnerabilities that may
compromise the systems depending on them. The
presence of dynamic dependencies and non-standard
update channels make it difficult to track vulnerable
components. It is definitely recommended to check for
CVEs [35]. CVEs are Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures, a MITRE-curated catalog of announced
vulnerabilities in software systems and components
that show existing vulnerabilities in the third-party
packages and frameworks on which your software
depends. CVEs can also be found in the US NIST
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [36]. Tools
such as OWASP Dependency Check can help with this
task [37]. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that
the interaction of secure components can result in a
vulnerability, and those are not likely to be detected
by automated tools.
During the assessment, every time we found a vulnera-
bility, we reported it to the head of the development team.
We jointly discussed the mitigations and re-assessed the
mitigated version of their software. This process sometimes
took several iterations. It is worth mentioning that the own-
ers of the software addressed the security issues extremely
promptly. The cost associated with fixing the software was
small as compared to the prohibitive cost of being victim of
a cyber-attack.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
For this project, we formed a key collaboration between
an experienced academic cybersecurity team and a well-
known commercial software provider that manages maritime
shipping. We started with a detailed study of the electronic
(and paper) information flow involved in maritime freight
shipping, highlighting the cyber components involved in
this domain. From this study, it was clear that electronic
information dominated these processes, and that the ICT
systems involved are critical to safe and timely deliveries of
shipments.
In addition, we showed a critical gap in the evaluation
of the security of these ICT systems. While there have
been useful risk assessments of ports, including identifying
cybersecurity as a key area of risk, these assessments did
not go on to evaluate the software for actual vulnerabilities.
For what we believe it is the first time, we conducted a
deep dive software vulnerability assessment of some of the
critical modules of the TOS and PCS provided by Total Soft
Bank. To do that, we applied the First Principles Vulnerabil-
ity Assessment (FPVA) methodology to those systems and
found several significant vulnerabilities in the code. Most of
these vulnerabilities would not have been found by the more
common practices of using software scanning tools or black-
box penetration testing.
Our study provided strong evidence that the shipping
domain would benefit from more in-depth software vulner-
ability assessments, whether it is motivated by regulation,
stakeholder trust, or other means.
Total Soft Bank, who allowed their software to be used
for this assessment, has taken a significant step forward in
providing the maritime shipping industry with a model for
more secure ICT infrastructure. This is only a first step, and
we hope to see this work extended to other vendors and other
aspects of maritime shipping. The goal is to address this
problem in a global way.
We believe that this work could provide the foundation
for recommendations and guidelines for the maritime freight
shipping sector on securing the code of their ICT systems
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